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Building on the case of the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), this working paper provides 
an analysis of the World Bank’s new aid allocation mechanisms in relation to representative 
politics.   
 
If the participatory agenda rooted at the heart of the new international aid architecture has 
offered new opportunities for different actors to participate in their country’s PRS, not all 
members of society have been granted a seat at the table. Participation therefore, is 
effectively an instrument by which some groups are given access and others are being 
marginalised. While debates have been raging on the quality of Civil Society Organisations 
(CSO) participation in PRS, there has curiously been very little discussion over the 
significant absence of Members of Parliament (MPs) from the process. Until recently, the 
Bank has been keen to justify such absence by emphasising MPs’ long lasting record of 
predatory behaviour as well as their lack of capacity. And there is no doubt such behaviour 
has been endemic in the parliaments of many countries under reform. However, after years of 
excluding parliamentarians from the PRS process, the Bank has recently developed an 
interest in them.  
 
Beyond the clear attempt to infuse legitimacy within the reform process, this paper suggests 
that PRS are mechanisms by which the Bank attempts to construct a new mode of authority 
by attempting to capture, coopt and mobilise civil society elements behind the market 
agenda. As such, this paper provides an analysis of why parliaments have overwhelmingly 
been bypassed in the PRS process and more interestingly, how they have come to be replaced 
de facto by certain segments of civil society. The argument here is that this represents a form 
of neopopulism that bypasses existing political arrangements and substitutes new forms of 
social contract with newly depoliticised stakeholders. As such, PRS establish technocratic 
precedents which aim to free the state from what is perceived as the debilitating effects of 
political bargaining (Jayasuriya 2001: 1). Such a clear anti-political framework brings forth 
serious concerns in relation to the Bank’s failure to acknowledge the benefits of politics as a 
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mechanism for societal deliberation. Crucially, such process marginalises issues linked to 
rights, citizenship and political contestation.  
 
This working paper is divided into four sections. The first part provides an analysis of the 
politics of defining the concept of civil society. Following this, the problematic of replacing 
existing representation structures such as the institution of parliament with a participatory 
process based on the illusive civil society is analysed. In the third part of the paper, it is 
argued hat the anti-democratic sentiments evident within the Bank’s new aid model has 
resulted in ambivalent attitudes towards the representative process within second and third 
generations of PRS. It will become apparent that there has been a shift in the Bank’s take on 
the involvement of parliamentarians. While MPs were once defined as problematic and 
unmanageable, more recent World Bank documents now define them as new allies against 
corruption and a source of legitimacy for the reforms. In addressing such recent shifts in the 
Bank’s perception of parliaments, the last section of this paper offers a discussion on the 
issue of political representation in the Bank’s attempt to reach out to MPs and certain 
segments of civil society.  
 
The leading argument of this paper is to correlate the World Bank’s narrative and practices to 
promoting neopopulism in countries under reform, a process which curtails the realm of 
political of society. In turn, it is argued that objectives of the Bank’s new narrative and aid 
allocation mechanisms are to redefine the very concept of citizenship. 
 
1. The Politics of Entrapment: Civil Society vis-à-vis the State 
 
In order to disentangle the World Bank’s elusive narrative on the new aid architecture – 
which is loosely attached to the Millennium Development Goals and promotes positive 
concepts such as participation and ownership – from the concrete aid allocation mechanisms 
it has recently promoted – such as the PRSi, we here propose the use of the term ‘Integrated 
Development Model’ (IDM)ii. Such term thus takes into account the existing contradictions 
within the Bank’s new aid paradigmiii – which emerged out of the Wolfensohn era – whereby 
a social development narrative often clashes with geo-political realities and pro-market 
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objectives. The IDM is thus an important tool to differentiate the Bank’s narrative from what 
is actually being carried out in countries under reform. This translates the argument by which 
the aid reform is on the one hand, far more than a mere discursive shift at the Bank and on 
the other hand, that it cannot solely be assessed by its aid allocation mechanisms. In other 
words, the IDM is both a theory – which is overwhelmingly rooted in New Institutional 
Economics; a social narrative seeking legitimacy both for the Bank itself and for its policies; 
and finally, a method to carry out the ideas of the post-Washington Consensus. 
 
In this section, it is argued that if the PRS process does introduce important roles for civil 
society that transcends a mere cosmetic attempt to provide legitimacy, these changes 
nevertheless have political ramifications for the exercise of state authority. As such, civil 
society’s participatory roles within the PRS process imply a new view of civil society which 
is closely linked to neopopulism – here defined as a form of rule that seeks to bypass existing 
political arrangements and to introduce new forms of social contract to stakeholders. 
 
It is well established that civil society is a very elusive concept (Biekart 1999; Edwards 2004; 
Rooy 1997; Wood 1990). It has many definitions and serves the purpose of various political 
interests. Everyone across the political spectrum – from the far right to the far left – have 
been embracing it. As observed by Edwards: 
Conservatives see associations as vehicles for rebuilding traditional moral values while 
progressives see them as vehicles for rebuilding whole societies, and the world. […] 
Increasingly, it seems, voluntary associations are expected to organize social services, 
govern local communities, solve the unemployment problem, save the environment, and 
still have time left over for rebuilding the moral life of nations (2004: 19). 
Defining the concept of civil society is therefore rarely a politically neutral exercise. 
 
While the Left traditionally used civil society as a collective noun to represent the poor and 
oppressed, neoliberals have frown on the concept all together, preferring to deal with 
individuals operating within a series of voluntary transactions. On the one hand, such 
individuals may constitute a progressive and self-reliant force that flourishes without the state 
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while on the other hand, they may form predatory coalitions in search of rents. Such dual 
analysis of civil society by the neoliberalsiv remains the key to understanding the ongoing 
contradictions emerging from the PRS experiences. The Bank’s choice to make civil 
society’s participation one of the main pillars of the IDM reflects the newly pragmatic 
approach adopted by the institution. It reflects the difficulties faced by the Bank in imposing 
markets and ‘good governance’ throughout the 1990s and the need to implement a strategy to 
capture, co-opt and mobilise civil society behind the market agenda.  
 
While the emphasis is most often given to the positive functions of NGOs, such as their 
abilities to better reach the poorest and to represent them, civil society also has important 
downsides. The fragmentation of NGO membership sheds doubt on their representative 
nature: What voices do they represent? What accountability structures do they really have? In 
reality, NGOs are extremely diversified and they also face accountability problems and 
legitimacy crisis.  
 
While granting legitimacy to the reform process, donors have also come to depend on NGOs 
technical functions in the development industry. In such a context, the ‘representative’ nature 
of NGOs has to be questioned. As Paul (1996) – the Executive Director of Global Policy 
Forum – observes in his discussion of the World Bank ‘partnerships’ with NGOs, there are 
important concerns that, with its enormous wealth, the Bank is able: ‘to “buy” small 
grassroots NGOs in the South, to gain legitimacy for its projects’. One might recall that 
donors’ interest in civil society emerged out of the troubled waters of the early 1990s, when 
they finally addressed the governance predicament of the states under reform. NGOs then 
became a way to channel donors’ moneys away from corrupt bureaucrats and failed 
institutions. External funding to NGOs mushroomed throughout the 1990s, a phenomenon 
that was equalled only by the astonishing multiplication of non-profit organisations across the 
Global South. 
 
Beyond their obvious financial dependence on foreign donor agents, NGOs do not 
necessarily have accountable structures and their membership often remains difficult to 
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assess. Furthermore, NGO members may sometimes adopt a certain position simply to seek 
more funding or maintaining it. As observed by Carroll during the participatory process in a 
Country Assistance Strategy: ‘NGOs were vocal at the CAS meeting and they present a 
position that they know what’s going on. But they have an interest. NGOs don’t want to 
break down the problem’ (Carroll 2007: 620). Not only do NGOs often choose to act in a 
way which they know will please their funding partners but they also have an unspoken 
interest in a specific problem to continue in order for their source of funding to be 
maintained. In their study of the PRS process, Molenaers and Renard: 
And not to forget, creating wide debate within civil society, with the prospect of becoming 
an interlocutor for the donor community and the government, can wet the appetite of 
ambitious civil society entrepreneurs, resulting in clashes of interest, both ideological and 
material, among poorly organized and often autocratically managed pressure groups, 
NGOs, trade unions, human rights groups, and the like. (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 16) 
 
This point further relates to the greater debate of the ‘NGOisation’ of development which 
refers to the politics of NGO proliferation in the last decadesv (see Edwards 2004; Hearn 
2007; Rooy 1997). In her extensive study of civil society building in Africa, Hearn observes 
that bilateral and multilateral donors have contributed throughout the 1990s, to build a very 
specific kind of ‘civil society’: 
[...] foreign support to civil society in all three countries [Ghana, South Africa and 
Uganda], is not about the breadth and depth of actually existing, largely rural based civil 
society. Donors are not funding the popular sector of society, but are strengthening a new 
African elite committed to the promotion of a limited form of procedural democracy and 
structural-adjustment-type economic policies in partnership with the West. The sixty or so 
organizations that I identified as donor-funded form the core of the kind of liberal civil 
society that is being ‘socially engineered’ in Africa (Hearn 1999: 4). 
 
While the new development model is presented under the umbrella of inclusiveness, it seems 
that, in practice, it might actually do the exact opposite. As argued by Harriss, there is a “dark 
side” here as NGOs can also be rent seeking: ‘A moment’s reflection shows that ‘social 
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capital’ for one group of people may constitute ‘social exclusion’ for others […]’ (2002: 8).  
 
The World Bank’s approach to civil society is highly depoliticised both in terms of its 
composition and its political function. On the one hand, the Bank reduces civil society’s 
legitimate composition – only the poor are legitimate interlocutors, non-poor voices are 
disregarded – and on the other hand it confines civil society’s participation to a very specific 
areas of debate (Lafortune 2003). Hickey and Mohan suggest that there are many problems 
associated with the current involvement of CSOs, the first being their ‘confused status 
between civic, public and private institutional spheres’ (2005: 241). In redirecting the state’s 
traditional function as provider of rights (civil, political and socio-economic), it is now civil 
society that is increasingly entrusted with the responsibility for promoting the common good. 
As Kamat underlines, there has been a curious shift in who bears the legitimacy of such 
responsibility:  
In a curious flip-flop of what served as a universal conceptual frame for development 
planning, the state, today, is represented as fragmented by private interests (otherwise 
referred to as corruption), and hence inept at representing the will of the people, whereas 
civil society is seen as the honest broker of ‘the people’s interests’ (2004: 160). 
 
This all derives from the neoliberal view of the state (with its roots in modernisation theory 
of the 1960s) as a neutral adjudicator of competing demands, implementer of policies that 
provide the common good – a highly abstracted and technocratic interpretation of its role and 
power. The entry of NGOs into the equation can thus be seen as a reaction to a breakdown of 
state capacity after more than two decades of neoliberal policy reform. While the attention 
now paid to NGOs is intended to address the effects of drastic economic medicine prescribed 
by the International Financial Institutions in the last decades, it also potentially undermines 
NGO functions in the very framework within which they are integrated (see Carroll 2007; 
Harriss 2002; Hearn 1999; Jayasuriya 2001; 2006; Rooy 1997). Furthermore, the idea of 
NGOs as an alternative to the existing state opens to door to chaos and uncertainty. The idea 
that NGOs can be more efficient and cheaper in providing services than the state remains 
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questionable. As argued by Rooy: ‘Policies that promote civil society organizations to the 
detriment of functioning state services may do no one any favours’ (1997: 17).  
 
It is indeed revealing that organisations with a strong political mandate – such as trade unions 
and members of parliament – are often noticeably absentees from the PRS process. In fact, 
civil society – or rather elements of it – are given a voice in what are essentially technical 
matters of implementation. While a small proportion of society is given a voice on matters 
that do not influence the organisation of power, concepts of rights and democracy are 
subsumed, together with the representative role of parliaments and political parties. This is 
the subject of the remaining sections of this paper. 
 
2. The Ambiguity of Ownership: Parliaments and the PRS Process  
 
The growing trend towards the cooption of NGOs within the new aid architecture brings forth 
the question of democratic representation within countries under reform. There is indeed a 
greater agenda which appears to be intrinsically rooted at the very core of the IDM’s 
philosophy which is linked to neopopulism. It is here argued that the Bank has chosen the 
path of technocratic populism rather than helping to build effective democracies in countries 
under reform. Such thesis is argued in the following sections, first by addressing the role 
assigned to the institution of parliament in the PRS process and then by tackling the 
implications of such roles on the very idea of democracy and citizenship. 
 
Shifting toward IDM in the late 1990s, the Bank’s narrative became highly focused on 
‘country ownership’ and ‘participation’ and national parliaments gradually received more 
attention. In fact, while the World Bank has done some capacity building work related to 
parliaments since 1995, it is the Comprehensive Development Framework and the following 
PRS that prompted the institution to give greater attention to parliaments: 
Since the late eighties, a wave of democratization has swept the world. [...] With that 
dramatic rise [of elected democracies] comes a marked increase in the number of elected 
officials [...]. It’s an impact that has not been overlooked by the World Bank. 
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‘Development clearly works best when the process is country-led and based on 
partnerships’, says World Bank president James D. Wolfensohn. The World Bank strongly 
encourages parliamentary involvement in the development process. [...] In keeping with 
this global expansion of parliamentarians, the World Bank has stepped up the ways in 
which the members of parliament and Bank staff can exchange information and gain 
greater understanding of the impact of development – both at a local and global level 
(World Bank 2006b). 
 
Today, the World Bank’s programs toward parliaments are initiated via three central sources: 
the Development Policy Dialogue Team, the World Bank Institute (WBI) and the capacity 
building programs, country offices and country teams. They are also reflected in the Bank’s 
support for partnerships and programs more generally. These initiatives are defined by the 
Bank as the institution’s official attempt to open up a debate with broader constituencies 
(Interview with Bas, November 17, 2006). According to Jean-Christophe Bas, the Manager 
of the Development Policy Dialogue at the World Bank, the Bank has become a ‘dialogue 
facilitator’ for a greater involvement of MPs in the development process (Interview 
November 17, 2006). 
 
However PRS experiences have so far shown little participation of parliamentarians in the 
process, a fact that Alan Gelb, Director of the Development Policy at the World Bank openly 
acknowledgedvi (Interview September 18, 2006). Eberlei and Henn’s analysis of the PRS 
experience in Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that: ‘[…] little attention was given – in either 
theory or practice – to the people’s representatives, the parliaments’ (2003: 27). World 
Development Movement further concludes that the participation of MPs has been limited in 
more than 26 countries (Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 18). 
 
In the majority of the PRS cases where parliaments were indeed involved, the participation 
was limited to a few MPs participating in workshops, without a link to the institution of 
parliament itself (Eberlei and Henn 2003; Gould and Ojanen 2003; Jones and Hardstaff 2005; 
Youash 2003). Other organisations such as the Overseas Development Institute and the 
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European Commission have also expressed concern regarding the relative failure to involve 
parliaments in the PRS process (Leautier 2002: 180). Gould and Ojanen’s findings on 
Tanzania are more than revealing of such trend as they observe: ‘In fact, most 
parliamentarians interviewed for this study had never heard of the PRSP [Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper]’ (2003: 94). 
 
This lack of attention to the legislative branch in the PRS process is customarily explained by 
the fact that parliaments often face fundamental constrains of all sorts that hamper their 
representative, legislative and oversight functions. As summarised by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, these failures are often linked to the: ‘[…] 
lack of technical expertise, the lack of funds, and the lack of access to information’ and ‘last, 
but hardly least, whether parliamentarians have the political will to use their oversight 
functions’ (2002: 24). It is indeed undeniable that parliaments’ institutional weaknesses are 
often linked to the scarcity of resources and lack of institutional infrastructures such as 
electoral commissions, ombudsmen, parliamentary oversight committees, highly-trained civil 
servants in both central and local government, police forces, schools, and accessible, 
impartial judicial systems (Commonwealth Secretariat 2003: 12). One might observe 
however that some of these deficiencies have paradoxically been directly weakened by more 
than twenty years of structural adjustment programs in many African countries. 
 
Crucially, donors disinterest in parliaments in the last decade is undeniably linked to 
neopatrimonial tendencies of many parliamentarians. Politics is often linked to patronage by 
which well-connected individual voters expect a direct form of assistance from their MP, 
which translates into a patron-client form of politics (UNDP n.d.), or as Bayart coined it ‘la 
politique du ventre’ (1992). Eberlei and Henn argue that Africa is plagued by 
neopatrimonialism, which symptoms are: ‘[...] presidentialism, clientism and the use of state 
resources for the purposes of political legitimation. In many African countries, members of 
parliament in particular are still tainted as being part of the system of organised political 
patronage’ (2003: 21-14).  
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There is no doubt that MPs long lasting record of predatory behaviour has been endemic in 
many countries under reform, not withstanding parliamentarians’ chronic lack of capacity. 
However, in opting to bypass parliaments altogether, the PRS model has been facing a crisis 
in legitimacy, as analysed in the following section. 
 
3. Acknowledging Parliaments 
 
In this part, the Bank’s recent initiatives to mainstream parliamentary involvement in the PRS 
process are analysed. After an assessment of the new IDM’s narrative on parliamentarians, an 
analysis of the specific role it now envisions for the formerly marginalised actor is provided. 
 
The World Bank has increasingly acknowledged its failure to emphasise the important role 
parliaments could play in the PRS process. At the heart of the problem was the fact that PRS 
were facing an immediate legitimacy crisis linked to the obvious failure to involve the 
representative of the people within the so-called participatory process. For Leautier, the Vice 
President of the World Bank Institute, the ownership imperative does serve to: ‘[...] avoid 
potential criticisms that policies and priorities are being imposed by the Washington-based 
institutions’ (2002:179). Furthermore, as NGOs and international advocacy groups are 
closely monitoring the PRSP progresses, parliaments in all logic, must be included in the 
participation process if the initiatives are to be promoted as being ‘owned’ by the country. 
This has been reflected in a report for parliamentarians as well: 
Overall, though, the role of Parliaments in the PRS process has been limited. This has 
proved to be a cause for concern for many development partners. Several World Bank 
reports have raised the issue along with a number of development partners such as the 
Utstein Group of bilateral donors (the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, and 
Norway) and the European Union. Individual parliamentarians also have raised this issue 
(Chevalier, Kingham and Trapp 2005: 43). 
 
In reminiscing on the first experiences of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank, 
which was created in 2000vii, Jean-Christophe Bas recalls that there were ‘strong issues’ right 
   
 12
from the start. Citing the Kenyan experience as an example, he evokes the tensions created 
by involving opposition MPs in the Network’s platform and how the Kenyan executive 
strongly reacted (Interview November 17, 2006). It is true that the World Bank has 
traditionally shied away from direct engagement in democracy promotion and legislative 
attention. The obvious reason for such choice is rooted in Article IV of the IBRD Articles of 
Agreement, which clearly emphasises the apolitical nature of the Institutionviii. As such, 
channels between Bank staff and reforming countries government have traditionally followed 
the executive branch. And as argued in the previous section, NGOs in a way had become a 
means of addressing the democratic deficit of bypassing parliaments. 
 
However, there is now a clear shift in the Bank’s perception of parliamentarians, at least 
discursively. Bas’ statements are quite revealing of such fact. The Development Policy 
Dialogue manager indeed observes that the change on how the Bank’s staff perceived 
parliamentarians was ‘day and night’ (Interview November 17, 2006). This change in 
perception of MPs is further argued by Jean-Francois Rischard, the World Bank vice-
president for Europe, who claimed that there had been a ‘revolution’ in the Bank in the last 
few years (reported by Bretton Woods Project 2005). 
 
While there is a crucial change brought forth by the IDM’s focus on ownership and 
participation which has undoubtedly favoured a narrative focused towards parliament 
inclusion, the key question however remains to assess how exactly MP’s are now to be 
involved in the PRS process. In turn, such analysis sets the scene for a deeper understanding 
of why the Bank has actually now chosen to embrace parliaments in its reform process. While 
the Bank’s thirst for legitimacy for its backed policy reforms undoubtedly counts for an 
important part of its sudden interest in MPs, an analysis of the new functions assigned to MPs 
in the PRS process reveals an agenda that has sticking similarities with the depoliticised role 
assigned to civil society. It is here proposed to first look at the new roles assigned to the 
institution of parliament in the PRS process. An analysis of the consequences of such turn in 
the Bank’s policies is then provided. 
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3.1 Integrating Parliaments Into the PRS Narrative 
 
It is clear in the Bank’s literature that there has been a shift in favour of engaging with MPs 
in the PRS process. However, in light of the IDM’s instrumentalisation of the concepts of 
ownership and participation, it is imperative to unpack the Bank’s take on parliamentarians’ 
‘participation’. And this was precisely the point of Khalifa Ababacar Sall, a Senegalese MP 
and member of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank who argued that the ‘real 
question’ about the PRS is ‘why is this important to us to participate?’ (Interviewed 
September 19, 2006) Sall observes that while he agrees that the PRS proposal for MPs 
participation is ‘an evolution’ of the World Bank, he wonders if the results won’t be the same 
as the last 25 years of failed economic policies imposed by the multilateral institution: ‘we 
are still poor’ concludes Sall (Interviewed September 19, 2006). While the MP does think 
that:  ‘it is time to integrate the parliamentarians in the process if you want to succeed’, he 
emphasises the need to know what role parliamentarian are to play in the process of policy 
formulation (Interviewed September 19, 2006). 
 
A key element of the Bank’s take on parliamentarians’ involvement can be found in the 
Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies to which the Bank has recently added an annex 
(Hubli and Mandaville 2004) specifically dedicated to parliaments. Let us recall that the 
Sourcebook is a compilation of chapters that details the views of the Bank and the IMF on the 
PRS and intended as a guide for countries in strengthening their development strategies. 
Although the Bank asserts that the Sourcebook is intended to be only suggestive, it also states 
that it reflects the ‘thinking and practices associated with the Comprehensive Development 
Framework, the World Development Report 2000/2001, good international practices related 
to poverty reduction, and emerging experience about the effective design and implementation 
of PRSP (World Bank n.d.: vii). In this respect, the addition of an annex in the Sourcebook 
specifically dedicated to parliaments should leave no doubt about the Bank’s attempts to 
amend its former minimalist view of legislatures in the PRS process. The annex indeed 
recognises the pivotal role they should play: 
 
   
 14
Under most constitutions, legislatures are the most representative element of a country’s 
national government. Although in some cases this representative potential has been latent or 
underutilized due to political conditions or lack of resources, parliaments remain an obvious 
mechanism for encouraging poor people’s input into national poverty reduction policies and 
ensuring cooperation from a variety of political actors. The representative responsibilities of 
parliament, as assigned by each country’s constitution, provide a greater level of ownership 
and legitimacy than other participatory methods, such as stakeholder workshops (Hubli and 
Mandaville 2004: 13). 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the annex strives for greater involvement of parliaments in all four 
components of the PRSP cycle – i.e. poverty diagnosis, development, implementation 
process and finally, monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP.  
 
Figure 1 
Possible Mechanisms for Parliamentary Engagement in the PRSP Cycle 
 
Source: Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 5. 
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In terms of poverty diagnosis, the Sourcebook focuses on parliamentarians’ capacity to 
‘provide the only political representation for large numbers of citizens from specific 
geographic or demographic constituencies’ (Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 7). Under the rubric 
of contribution to development of the PRSP, the Sourcebook states that a greater involvement 
of MPs could lead to greater consensus on PRSP and thus ‘pave the way for smoother 
implementation over time’. According to the Sourcebook, such involvement would not only 
result in a greater national ownership of the PRS process but would also provide the PRSP 
with an existing body of politically active national leaders and staff of varying skill levels 
and interests (Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 8). As for the PRSP implementation level, the 
Sourcebook calls for parliamentarian involvement at three levels: budget allocations, 
legislation and educating the public about PRS processes, programs, and impact. It is stated 
that parliamentarians’ main task should be to align national legislation with PRSP priorities, 
approve PRSP-compatible budgets and pass PRSP-relevant legislation (Hubli and Mandaville 
2004: 12). The fourth and final component of the PRSP cycle – monitoring and evaluation – 
emphasises the role of Committee hearings on the impact of PRSP, an annual review of the 
PRSP Progress Reports. 
 
The World Bank’s renewed attention on parliaments warrants some caution. In his thorough 
analysis of the Sourcebook’s annex, Youash observes that the suggested take on legislature 
has thrown the Bank’s position from one extreme to the other, from a ‘Rubber stamp 
legislature’ to a ‘Transformative legislature’ (2003: 13). The key point to note is that if the 
Bank’s previous framework gave few possibilities for legislatures to influence or debate the 
issues at hand, the annex propels legislatures – at least theoretically – towards its rarest type; 
one where bodies are capable of both representing and shaping societal demands (Youash 
2003: 13). However, as stated by Johnson and Nakamura, this type of legislature is rather 
uncommon as it aims not only to represent but also to lead (1999). This requires a specific 
structure not only capable of dealing with differences, but that is equipped with information 
capacities permitting the initialisation of policies as well. Youash observes: ‘Not surprisingly, 
there are not many examples of such legislatures, and those that do exist do not always live 
up to the requirements’ (1999). While the PRS Sourcebook’s annex on parliaments does 
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contradict such an interpretation, Youash further observes that the document mentions no 
implementation processes, an omission that clashes with the surgical attention the executive 
branch receives in the area of public expenditure in the PRS Sourcebook: 
The difficulty with this leap [of the World Bank] is that no detailed road map is provided 
for such a transition and more importantly, no guiding logic is provided for making such a 
shift. [...] What is generated by such an approach is a rather hobbled together set of 
prescriptions with little substantive reasoning behind them and a seemingly naïve hope 
that demanding such a role of parliament will immediately necessitate its capacitation for 
fulfilling the proposed functions (2003: 14). 
 
A clear conclusion here is that the Bank’s outreach to MPs obviously greatly motivated by a 
need for bringing some legitimacy to the PRS process. Manish Bapna – Executive Director of 
the Bank Information Center – observes that the Bank had to recognise that its failure to 
reach out to parliamentarians was ‘a real and honest threat’ (Interviewed October 15, 2006). 
Bapna further argues that in the midst of a ‘strong interest to reclaim the national policy 
space’, the Banks attempts to enter the national stage without the authority of doing so is the 
institution ‘Hercules heel’ (Interviewed October 15, 2006). The key question however 
remains to ask how exactly the Bank is bringing parliamentarians on board. Here the PRS 
Sourcebook suggests that MPs participation could be better understood via the narrow 
window of governance oversight in which parliamentarians are indeed invited to play a 
greater role. Beyond the Bank’s enthusiastic narrative, this is a technical and depoliticised 
role that narrowly fits governance and anti-corruption objectives. Such analysis of the 
Sourcebook sets grounds for further questioning on the apparent apolitical nature of the 
IDM’s interest in the institution of parliament. 
 
3.2 Coopting Parliaments 
 
This depoliticised integration of MPs in the second and third generations of PRS may be 
further understood as a means to manage the veto gates that they represent within the PRS 
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process, as argued in this section. As such, this new enthusiasm towards MPs represents an 
attempt to coopt the institution of parliament in favour of the reform process. 
 
During an extensive interview with Jean-Christophe Bas (November 17, 2006), who actively 
contributed to the creation and the design of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank, 
it became clear that the Bank had realised that bypassing MP’s was becoming a greater 
problem than not involving them. This is to say that beyond the legitimacy crisis in which 
avoiding the institution of parliament had plunged the Bank into, the multilateral institution 
came to realise that MPs represented a significant veto gate to the reform and that as such, 
they needed to be managed. Bas observes that MPs in the past would only be in contact with 
the World Bank in case of crisis, a fact ‘which is not very conductive’ (Interview November 
17, 2006). Furthermore, the Bank’s recent interest in parliaments is overwhelmingly linked to 
the very concrete fact that MPs in many countries have to vote on PRSP. On the subject, Bas 
underlines that:  
MP’s are decision makers. They represent a growing force in many countries. […] some 
parliamentarians have to approve the Bank’s loans which means that if a country director 
is confronted by a parliament that is reluctant to the reform, he is in a bad shape’ 
(Interview November 17, 2006). 
 
An obvious example of the problematic linked to the failure to involve MPs in the PRS 
process is the fact that in some countries, PRSPs have bluntly been anti-constitutional (Jones 
and Hardstaff 2005; Action Aid and coll. 2005). This is because PRS indeed often require 
secondary legislation to be passed. Let us recall that PRSPs are meant to direct a reforming 
country’s policies for three years. Following an analysis investigating the role played by 
parliaments during the implementation of PRS in 28 African states, Eberlei and Henn state 
that the marginal role played by parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa in PRS had indeed in 
some cases, breached explicit constitutional rights (2003: 9). 
 
A greater involvement of parliamentarians throughout the PRS process would thus increases 
the chances for parliamentarians’ endorsement if and when PRSP are submitted to 
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legislatures. As observed in the PRS Sourcebook: ‘A parliament that has already played an 
active role in the diagnosis and development of its PRSP will be better able to coordinate 
such legislation’ (Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 14). 
 
With this in mind, an analysis of the PRS Sourcebook is quite revealing. It is indeed evident 
that that the Soucebook’s proposals for MPs involvement in the budget cycle is tailored 
precisely to manage the actors’ tasks in the PRS process. The Sourcebook’s chapter on 
‘Public Spending’ outlines the Bank’s given ‘good practices in budgeting and public financial 
management in the context of implementing affordable pro-poor policies’ (Fozzard et al. n.d.: 
189). It identifies eleven steps in an ‘idealised’ budget cycle, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
The Budget Cycle 
 
Source: Fozzard et al. n.d.: 192. 
 
Out of these eleven steps, eight require solely the executive to act in policy formulation, one 
allows for the Auditor-General to review the government’s accounts, while the parliament’s 
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role in the budget cycle is relegated to the two remaining stages – i.e. steps seven and eleven 
(Youash 2003: 4). While these given functions are indeed important, they are however quite 
reductive as parliament’s role remains marginal and deprived of any meaningful political 
contribution. In their study of the Tanzanian PRS process, Gould and Ojanen’s do observe 
that the budget process is: ‘an aid-conditioned exercise where the structures of power created 
by the iron triangle between donors, government and non-state actors leave the parliament 
without a proactive role’ (2003). 
 
The obvious similarities amongst the content of PRSP amongst reforming countries suggest 
that stakeholders’ influence – both civil society and MPs – has been quite limited, a trend that 
might not change with an increased parliamentarian involvement in the process, especially 
not a technical involvement as experienced in the last PRS. Hickey and Mohan’s article on 
politics and participation is here important to mention (2005). The authors argue that: 
[…] participatory approaches are most likely to succeed: (i) where they are pursued as part 
of a wider radical political project; (ii) where they are aimed specifically at securing 
citizenship rights and participation for marginal and subordinate groups; and (iii) when 
they seek to engage with development as an underlying process of social change rather 
than in the form of discrete technocratic interventions […] (Hickey and Mohan 2005: 237) 
 
A clear conclusion here is that while the PRS endeavour warrants a greater MP involvement, 
it is not on the basis of their political input as representatives of the people. When apposed to 
Hickey and Mohan’s given success criteria for participation, one can conclude that MPs role 
in the PRS is in fact better understood as technical facilitators for the reform process. This 
brings forth the question of the legitimacy of a participatory process that neglects the 
democratic channels already in place. In a brief authored by a coalition of NGOs and 
parliamentarians, it is observed that: 
Governments are supposed to lead the PRSP process, with the active participation of 
parliament and civil society. However, parliaments are regularly sidelined and key 
decisions regarding economic policies are often deliberately excluded from this process. 
Frequently, parliaments and the public are not even aware of conditions that will have 
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massive implications for their society. Worse still, the World Bank and IMF continue to 
over ride the express wishes of sovereign parliaments, undermining already fragile 
democratic processes and public faith in them (All Party Group on Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries 2004: 1). 
 
Experiences have revealed that even when MPs had indeed voiced their concerns regarding 
certain policy reform backed by the executive and the IFI, such concerns had rarely been 
taken into account. World Development Movement documented several examples of 
parliamentary opposition to IFI policies in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana, 
Honduras, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Moldova, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambiaix (Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 28). 
 
As such, Jean-Francois Rischard’s – the World Bank vice-president for Europe – claims that 
there has been a ‘revolution’ in the Bank in the last few years in regards to MPs perception, 
take another meaning (reported by Bretton Woods Project 2005). While he argues that 85 per 
cent of country staff reported meeting with parliamentarians on a regular basis (reported by 
Bretton Woods Project 2005), he rather reefer’s to the World Bank Institute efforts to ‘train 
parliamentarians about how to improve their oversight role’ (reported by Bretton Woods 
Project 2005). We are here far from a process where the representatives of the people are 
politically engaging in formulating their countries policies. It is therefore not without surprise 
to note the existence of an international petition signed by 1,100 MPs. It is calling for donors 
to acknowledge the importance of parliamentarians’ involvement in the economic policies of 
their respective countriesx: 
We therefore call on the BWIs [Bretton Woods Institutions] and their principal 
shareholders to ensure that the democratically elected representatives of recipient nations 
are the final arbiters of all economic policies in their countries. It is vital that national 
parliaments in recipient nations have the right and obligation to be fully involved in the 
development and scrutiny of all measures associated with BWI activities within their 
borders, and hold the final power of ratification. Ensuring the primacy of sovereign 
national parliaments in this way will improve implementation of measures to reduce 
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poverty, enhance good governance, and foster democracy (All Party Group on Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries 2004). 
Beyond the issue of the erosion of the legitimacy of the already fragile legislature in 
countries under reform, the Bank’s new outreach to parliaments is better define as an attempt 
to coopt MPs in playing a depoliticised role in the PRS process. As argued in the following 
section, this is an attempt which is embedded in the IDM’s neopopulist agenda and such 
attempt brings forth questions linked to the very concept of citizenship. 
 
4. Market Citizenship 
 
In this final section, the IDM is assessed in terms of its impact on representative politics. It is 
argued that the technocratic principles embedded in the IDM’s governance imperative, 
combined with a neopopulist take on civil society must be viewed as an attempt to transform 
traditional notions of citizenship. 
 
While the IDM is being promoted in terms of ownership and participatory principles, the 
analysis of the mechanisms rooted in the IDM clearly demonstrate neopopulist 
underpinnings. Neopopulism is here defined as a form of rule that seeks to bypass existing 
political arrangements and to introduce new forms of social contract to stakeholders deprived 
of any political role. Accordingly, it is a form of civil society consultation that has become 
the privilege source of policy legitimacy (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 93). It is a form of rule 
where individuals purportedly deal directly with policy-makers rather than operate through 
representative structures. The quest for decentralisation and local NGO participation is a 
clear instrument of such form of rule. After all, the IDM’s list of suggested stakeholders for 
participation in the PRS reveals that the Bank views MPs as just another actor within an 
undifferentiated pool of stakeholders – i.e. the general public, the poor and vulnerable 
groups, an organized civil society, the private sector, the government and the donor 
community. In practice, the involvement of parliamentarians in the PRS process has been 
limited to being part of a checklist with other government stakeholders that are consulted 
along with line agency departments (e.g. health, education, social welfare, roads and works), 
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the necessary local governments, and state/provincial governments (Youash 2003: 6). The 
result is that an official democratic institution is levelled to other stakeholders such as NGOs. 
 
It is interesting that the Sourcebook does acknowledge that MPs have a distinct ability to 
‘bring the input of local constituencies to the national level’ (Tikare et al. n.d.: 244). Such 
acknowledgment combined to the analysis of the depoliticised role assigned to the MPs at the 
national level suggests a form of neopopulist tendencies much similar to the IDM’s approach 
to civil society. Hence traditional arenas of political representation – such as the institution of 
parliament – remain marginal in terms of policy influence despite the framework’s rhetoric. 
 
The neopopulist agenda brings forth serious implications for the conceptual absentee of the 
new aid agenda: citizenship. Under the neo-liberal model, the notion of citizenship is reduced 
to the technicalities of participating in the electoral process and in the market economy; a 
market-citizenship. Stripped from its political structure, participation is geared towards the 
market and, through an identity now downsized to that of producer/consumer, citizens are 
expected to maximize their individual interests. In such light, the ultimate right of the citizen 
is that of individual freedom – i.e. the state’s jurisdiction should be ‘restricted to a bare 
minimum as any positive role impinges on the rights of the individual’ (Taylor 1998: 24). As 
it was argued by Gill, the Bank’s enthusiasm for civil society participation represents an 
attempt to ‘legitimate a hierarchical and unequal system of representation in the making of 
state policy’ (Gill 2000). 
 
The IDM here introduces a new type of ‘market citizenship’, one that does clash with the 
former post war social democracy model. What is key here to emphasise is thus the double 
transforming effect of the IDM on classical notions of rights and citizenship. The first one is 
linked to the neutralisation of the possible veto gates to the reform process. This is where for 
example new policies towards the depoliticisation of legislatures are actively pursued. This is 
also where key mechanisms of restrains are promoted deep within the state architecture, 
notably under the umbrella of governance reforms (Campbell 2005; Harrison 2004). Gill here 
observes that in such process: ‘the key areas of policy – relative to the “commanding heights” 
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of the economy and strategy are separated from real democratic participation and 
accountability’. This introduces the second transforming effect the IDM has on redefining 
citizenship which is the idea of channelling participation away from the realm of political 
societyxi. This is where certain segments of civil society become key players, as well as new 
social welfare instruments such as microcreditxii and the overall emphasis on building social 
capital. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3, political society is this intermediate realm where actors (political 
parties) and institutions (election, legislature), are mediating, articulating and 
institutionalizing the relations between the State and civil society (Biekart 1999: 58). 
However, it is here argued that such realm is contracting under the IDM, as political power is 
being redefined both in the state apparatus and civil society. This is to say that in focusing on 
civil society, rather than citizenship, the IDM is able to bypass the realm of political society. 
 
Figure 3 
The IDM and the Contraction of Political Society 
 
 
Adapted from Biekart 1999: 34. 
 
This contraction may also be viewed as a process which dislocates the real of political of 
society from the state and civil society. What Figure 4 illustrates is a process where the 
technocratisation of the state coupled with the depoliticisation of civil society is creating a 
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mechanisms specifically engineered to bypass the realm of political society in indebted 
countries. In this new model, civil society has an overarching importance, as it is the realm in 
which participation now takes place. As observed by Taylor, civil society has in effect 
become: ‘the primary site of socio-economic struggle, replacing political society as the key 
site of political struggle’ (Taylor 1998: 26). 
 
Figure 4 








The crux of this mutation from citizenship to civil society rooted in the IDM is the fact that 
the notion of rights – political, civil and socio-economic – is de facto evicted from the stage. 
Here the democratic rights of citizens to influence resource allocation is replaced by 
depoliticised local participation schemes which position certain segments of civil society 
where citizens use to be the main actors. As argued by Gill, the World Bank has developed 
its notion of ‘participation’: ‘to offset the limitations imposed on mass democracy in the 
economic realm by increasing democratic participation in other safely channelled areas’ (Gill 
2000).  
 
This current mutation from citizenship rights to targeting the poor depoliticizes issues closely 
related to power relations and resource allocation. As observed by Wood, the neoliberal view 
of civil society serves the objective of side-lining the concept of class: ‘to dissolve it in all-
embracing category or even any political relevance at all’ (1990: 79) At the heart of this 
transformation resides the highly political question of who owns the legitimate right of 
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indeed be less expensive for governments who already have difficulties addressing their debt 
service. Luxury of another era or not, this tendency puts an end to the universal programs 




If NGOs and more recently MPs are indeed being mainstreamed into the PRS process, the 
role they are assigned is overwhelmingly restricted to the narrow window of governance 
oversight, leaving little opportunity to influence the content of the strategies.  
 
This process is illustrative of the Bank’s decision that it may be more effective to coopt 
parliaments and certain segment of civil society within a functional, techno-managerial 
system, than excluding them from the entire process and thus risking future interference with 
PRS. The important point here is that civil society and MPs are not seen as a political site 
where interests organise to capture and overthrow or reorient the state, but rather as a useful 
watchdog deprived of political input. 
 
In engaging strictly with such stakeholders that have been stripped of their political role the 
Bank is attempting to insulate from political competition a highly political and normative 
agenda for the reordering of social and political power. This is significant and rather 
concerning since the IDM hides highly contentious issues behind technical responses. The 
PRS framework indeed clearly isolates key political options from the democratic realm, such 
as specific choices linked to the welfare state (Girishankar et al. n.d.: 148). These represent 
clear constrains on democratic choices which confer privileged rights of citizenship and 
representation to corporate capital (Gill 1995: 8). The IDM further suggests that the civil 
society option is preferred to that of helping to build effective democracies. 
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Notes 
 
i Other important aid allocation mechanisms rooted in the IDM are the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) – which is now referred to as the philosophy behind the IDM; the Country Assistance 
Strategy (CAS) and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). 
ii  This is extensively argued in Hatcher 2006. 
iii The Bank gives paternity to the rise of the new aid paradigm to its ninth president, James D. Wolfensohn 
(1995-2005). In 1998, Wolfensohn introduced the first corner stone of what was to become the institution’s new 
‘aid paradigm’: the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). The new framework was expected to 
drastically change the way the Bank and indeed the other major donors, thought, planned and allocated 
international aid – a process that was soon to be extended to debt relief. Recognizing the pivotal role that should be 
played by state and civil society alike, this model would, according to Wolfensohn, put developing countries’ 
governments back ‘in the driver’s seat’. See Wolfensohn 1999. 
iv See the work of public choice economists such as Buchanan and Tullock  (1962). See also Bebbington, 
Guggenheim, Olson and Woolcock (2004). 
v Hearn’s mapping of what she coins as ‘Africanization of the NGO-sector’ is interesting. She observes that 
by the end of the 1980s it became clear that the heavy white foreign presence was politically unsustainable and 
this led to the indigenization of the NGO-sector in Africa. She argues that since the private sector and the state 
were perceived as rent-seekers, the voluntary sector, with its significant inflows of external funding, had 
become the place to make money (2007: 1101). 
vi Gelb observed during an interview conducted during the Singapore Workshop on the World Bank that in fact: 
‘the World Bank has not involved parliamentarian in the reform process’ (September 18, 2006). 
vii Created in 2000, the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNOWB) is a network that aims to: 
‘encourage policy dialogue between legislators and the World Bank and the IMF, and to mobilize parliamentarians 
in the fight against poverty’ (Parliamentary Network on the World Bank 2005). 
viii The article states that: ‘The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned’. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of Agreement, Section 10, Article IV. 
ix Details on these cases are available online on World Development Movement website at: 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/democracy/parliament (accessed December 17, 2007) 
x According to the International Parliamentarians’ Petition 2005 Annual report, by the end of 2005, the 
petition had been signed by over 1100 MPs in 55 countries. World Development Movement states that it has 
been endorsed by the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank; UK All-Party Parliamentary Groups on Debt, 
Aid and Trade, World Government and Overseas Development; the Committee for a Democratic UN; the 
Committee of the Parliaments of the Americas; European Parliamentarians for Africa; and numerous civil 
society organisations and networks. Online. Available at 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/debt/IPPannualreport01022006.pdf (accessed January 10, 2009) 
xi  The idea of the redefinition of political society is analysed in the very context of the PRS in the article Hatcher 
2006. 
xii On the subject see Weber 2005. 
